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The red tongues of fire rushed up and flickered from corbel to corbel and from tablet
to tablet, and crept along the floor, setting in a blaze the seats and benches. The
dance of the shadows passed away, and the dance of the fires began.1
Introduction
The question of how societies come to terms with mass atrocity and large-scale political
violence, although written about extensively, is still not resolved. This irresolution becomes
even more acute when we consider how a past marred by mass atrocity continues to shape the
present, not only in the years immediately preceding, but also decades or possibly centuries
later. This is evident, for example, in questions of how colonialism and slavery still shape the
contemporary world, not to mention the struggles such phenomena present across time for
ideas such as collective healing or coming to terms with the past in some way.
This article will address one component of this debate; that is, how we conceptualize
the idea of collective healing over time and the consequences thereof for intergenerational
healing. In achieving this, we argue that there are two main issues that need to be taken into
account because of how important they are for understanding collective healing and because
they have been relatively undertheorized in the literature. These are the conditional and
ambivalent nature of healing and the importance of connecting the typically disconnected
topics of memory, history, and politics in order to understand better how collective healing is
rooted in a process of meaning making at an individual and societal level. Developing these two
aspects of healing builds a platform from which to discuss the signi cance of intergenerational
notions of healing. This understanding is essential given that questions raised by mass atrocity
—including colonialism, slavery, or speci c manifestations of racial oppression such as
apartheid—continue long after their formal demise.
The article will begin by summarizing some of the authors’ work on the issue of how
different mechanisms (most speci cally transitional justice processes such as truth
commissions) may or may not contribute to the notion of healing given that their meaning and
signi cance shift with time and context. Much of the work of the authors of this article has in
the past considered the impact of contemporary political con icts and peace processes, or
situations where extensive direct political violence has been committed in the last 10 to 50 years
such as in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Speci cally, we have considered how processes
such as truth commissions, and wider processes of memorialization and symbolic reparations,
can contribute to the healing of societies following political violence in and around so-called
peace processes.2 This work has involved, in addition to academic scholarship, activities such
as contributions to establishing memorials or working in collective therapeutic practice with
1

William Butler Yeats, Stories of Red Hanrahan, the Secret Rose, and Rosa Alchemica (New York: The MacMillan Company,
1914), 135.
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Brandon Hamber and Ingrid Palmary, “Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic Reparations,” in The Gender of
Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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victims. We have argued that the impact of contemporary strategies to address mass violence
such as truth commissions, memorials, or restorative justice policies are conditional and
interrelated in their impact, and also fundamentally linked to developing a new meaning of the
past.3
Over time we have come to recognize the importance of understanding healing over
longer periods of time and, in this article, we focus in on the conceptual areas that we feel have
been underdeveloped in the literature yet are essential for better understanding and responding
to the healing process intergenerationally. Understanding this builds a platform from which to
discuss what such learning and scholarship means intergenerationally.
One of the central challenges in a eld of this nature has been the complexity of
de ning terms given the subjective and contextualized nature of healing. Nevertheless, in
describing trauma and healing as intergenerational, we work from the assumption that the
second generation refers to those who were born after the of cial end of war—usually signaled
by the signing of peace agreements or political transition—but living with the ongoing legacies
of exclusion, con ict, and marginalization that stem from those con icts. Although this
de nition is somewhat loose, it recognizes both that the of cial end to a war is signi cant for
how people experience it, but also that it is inadequate in itself to bring about healing. Similarly,
what constitutes trauma for this approach to healing is far broader than a medicalized notion of
PTSD even though some studies have indeed shown that PTSD symptomology can exist in the
second generation. Rather, it draws on a broad notion of trauma as outlined for example by
Eisenbruch who talks of cultural bereavement as a way of capturing the subjective and
culturally shaped meaning of the traumatic rather than imagining it can be de ned in a
diagnostic way that is stable across time and place.4 Thus, what constitutes both trauma and
healing is shaped by context, which is itself a product of the interplay of history, politics, and
memory. It is this interplay that we are concerned with in this article. In working with the
assumption that trauma and healing cannot be de ned outside of its time and place, we see this
article as a contribution to the ongoing conceptualization of this slippery concept.
The Conditional and Ambivalent Nature of Healing
It is therefore quite signi cant, a structural element in the realm of human affairs, that
men [sic] are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and that they are unable to
punish what has turned out to be unforgivable.5
Whilst there is a great deal written about processes of collective healing, there are two
important components that we draw out here because they have been underdeveloped in the
literature; namely, that collective healing is fundamentally linked to developing a new
meaning of the past,6 and the process is conditional.
Creating a sense of meaning of what happened is a critical part of coming to terms with
a legacy of political violence.7 This is both an individual and a social task. Mechanisms that seek
to uncover what happened in the past by developing a coherent (though not necessarily agreed)
set of narratives and processes that create a cognitive meaning of an event or events for victims
and wider society is useful when dealing with the impact of violence.8 Methods of doing this

3

Ibid.

4

Maurice Eisenbruch, “From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian
Refugees,” Social Science & Medicine 33, no. 6 (1991), 673–680.
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Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), loc. 3676, Kindle.
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Ibid.

7

Brandon Hamber, Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and Mental Health (New York:
Springer, 2009).

8

Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (London:
Pandora, 1992).
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are multiple such as truth commissions, trials, social processes such as museums and archives,
as well as the sharing of stories about the past in the form of testimony, books, and lms.
However, all these processes are conditional and never run in isolation. There is a
tendency to evaluate different approaches used to address the past as if they were distinct,
unconnected objects (truth commissions, traditional and restorative justice mechanisms,
economic equity policies, etc.) and as if individuals engage with these in isolated ways,
meaning that we can delineate impact. However, in any society, processes will overlap and
unfold over time continually, and are shaped by the challenges of contemporary context,
whether this is new wars or social problems from poverty to pandemics.
The word conditional is used because victims of political con ict are unlikely to divorce
the questions of truth, justice, responsibility for violations, compensation, and of cial
acknowledgement of what happened to them from their healing process.9 Reparations, for
example, (including material and nominal measures such as compensation and memorials as
well as longer-term interventions to create, for example, inclusive education and economies) are
an example of a conditional process. Accepting reparation (or for it to have some reparative
psychological impact) is for example interrelated with questions of justice or apology. Without
justice, reparations can feel as if they are mere “blood money.”10 Even more challenging
concepts such as inter-group forgiveness following political atrocity have been found in a range
of contexts to be conditional on other processes such as an apology from the perpetrators,
acknowledgement, and accountability.11
Take for example the response given by the Japanese so-called “comfort women” to the
apology issued by Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan in 2001 in which he “extend[ed]
anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable
and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort
women”12 promising that Japan would “face up squarely to its past history and accurately
convey it to future generations.”13 In response, an open letter by the survivors claimed that:
The government of Japan claims it has “apologized many
times.” But what is the meaning of apology when it fails to
reach the heart of those to whom it is made? Apology is not an
alibi. The few surviving women do not want token words or
charity money. They want an apology that would nally
restore their sense of dignity. They also seek compensation with
an unequivocal acceptance of the government’s state
responsibility for its past wrongdoing.14
We see clearly in this response the conditionality of healing. The ways that it is shaped
by interconnected notions of reparation, apology, acknowledgment, and in this case the
restoration of dignity. In short, different approaches will be necessary (e.g., truth recovery
processes, apology, acknowledgment) to promote the psychological potential for the healing of

9

Hamber, Transforming Societies.
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Brandon Hamber and Richard A. Wilson, “Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in PostCon ict Societies,” Journal of Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2002), 35–53.

11

Brandon Hamber, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Paradise Lost or Pragmatism?,” Peace and Con ict: Journal of Peace
Psychology 13, no. 1 (2007), 115–125.

12

Cited in Hamber and Palmary, Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic Reparations, 372.
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Ibid. For a more extended discussion on the conditionality of memorialization, and also a discussion of the case, see
Hamber and Palmary, Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic Reparations, 369–374.
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VAWW-NET Japan, “Responsibility Denied: Japan’s Debate Over the Comfort Women,” Japan Focus: The Asia-Paci c
Journal 5, no. 3 (2007), 1.
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victims, but they will seldom be suf cient to deal with all the needs of individuals or even
groups of individuals.15
In addition, many have also argued and observed that the structural conditions in
which individuals live also shape how they might interpret attempts to address a violent past.16
For example, living in poverty has been found to shape the views of victims in terms of what is
needed to redress the past.17 What is focused on in societies emerging from political violence is
contested. Truth commissions, for example, have been critiqued for their limited focus on
crimes against the “bodily integrity” of individuals18 and a restricted concentration on civilpolitical rights.19 Such an approach ignores socio-economic, systemic, and structural violence,
and orientates healing strategies toward the medical and psychological needs of individuals
(trauma), rather than considering the impact of the social context on well-being.
It is no wonder that our research, as well as that of others, has routinely shown that
victims are ambivalent about the psychological outcomes of their participation in truth
commissions and other transitional justice processes.20 There is no quick x or standardized
method for addressing the legacy of political violence. Furthermore, how to understand healing
(and what needs healing) is wide-ranging and context-speci c. Not only are contemporary
methods (such as therapy, storytelling, and transitional justice mechanisms) to promote socalled healing conditional and insuf cient in themselves to address mass atrocity, but even the
notion of healing is problematic in some cases. Arguably using the word healing is
anachronistic to the types of mass atrocities (such as slavery or apartheid) and their destruction
not only of individuals physically and psychologically, but their wholesale impact on social,
cultural, and community life in the present and into the future. Melanie Klein, the
psychoanalytic theorist, says once harm is in icted, we can never completely “make good,”21
and as such, we need to accept that we cannot repair the irreparable (bring back the killed or
reconstitute society in the way it was). To this end, the future is always going to be an
ambiguous place haunted by the ghosts of the past, while we try to move forward. Coming to
terms with the past, especially with relation to mass atrocity, is therefore a life-long and
intergenerational process that is dynamic and changes over time.
Healing (mainly at the individual level), therefore, is learning to live with situations of
extreme suffering and integrating them into one’s life over time so that one can build
relationships and engage productively, ensuring that loss does not dominate everyday
experiences.22 Healing is always a contextual and ambivalent process. This ambivalence is
evident in the way that victims of gross violations of human rights must manage their everyday
lives (often in changing social circumstances and for many in poverty) and try to live with their
loss, while recognizing the irreparable nature of it at the same time as re-imagining the future.

15

Hamber, Transforming Societies.
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Lisa J. Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of
Violence through a Human Rights Framework,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008), 331–355;
Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and
Development,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008), 253–265.
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Simon Robins, “Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of the
Disappeared in Postcon ict Nepal,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 5, no. 1 (2011), 75–98.
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Mahmood Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremberg: The Historical Signi cance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South
Africa,”Politics & Society 43, no. 1 (2015), 72.
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International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 3 (2014), 339–361, accessed December 1, 2021, https://doi.org/
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Victims, and societies in transition, are invariably torn between wanting to let go of the past and
focusing on the future and wanting to remember simultaneously. Those who have perpetrated
violence (and some are victims as well), as with witnesses and the bene ciaries of political
con icts, are confronted with similar challenges. We need to acknowledge these complex
spaces, and in so doing, articulate multi-faceted understandings of the past.
We can, therefore, think of healing as a pendulum in the sense that victims move back
and forth between the past, present, and future. “Living with” the suffering of the past will
continually change relative to the social and political situation. We can think of the impact of the
past as sequential,23 i.e., how the traumas of the past are understood relative to different time
sequences. Dealing with the impact of political violence can differ for victims during times of
con ict, in transition, and during times of peace. The following extract is from a radio show on
January 28, 2008, documenting the voices of survivors of the La Mon Hotel bombing by the IRA
in 1978 in which 12 people died in Northern Ireland. The comments highlight the victims'
unhappiness with Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and now working
in government with Sinn Féin, who were closely linked with the IRA. The survivors are
seemingly, or had been, DUP supporters:
(…) for years, we have been told by the Democratic Unionist
Party that they wanted investigations carried out (…) to nd
out who was behind it. Since Paisley and McGuinness got
together, we haven’t heard one thing about these inquiries…
Personally, when I see Paisley and McGuinness [Sinn Féin and
Deputy First Minister] together and see them chuckling (…)
Aah (…) when people like ourselves sit and watch on the
television that sort of thing going on, it would really make you
sick. It would make your stomach turn. After all these promises
about never sitting down [together] (…) it really is annoying.24
What is evident from this excerpt is that for survivors, a transition to peace brings its
challenges. Once the con ict is over, individuals can be left questioning the meaning of their
suffering and what its signi cance is in a changed context. For the survivor quoted above, it
highlights that moving on for them is different from what moving on means for politicians.
They feel distressed that the political party they support is now working with the enemy. At a
macro level, the changes the comments refer to are ostensibly positive as the peace agreement in
Northern Ireland in 1998, and Ministers Paisley and McGuinness’ co-operation was, on the
whole, praised for being instrumental to peace. However, at the same time, for some
individuals, peace has negatively altered their meaning system. Thus, victimization is not only
tied to speci c historical incidents, and trauma is not a consistent variable determined by its
severity, but is continually reinterpreted across time and constantly revaluated in different
contexts. One way, therefore, to think of this is to consider the individual’s process of coming to
terms with the past as moving at a different pace from what might be happening at a political
level. There is often a juxtaposition between what could be considered the individual and
collective or political level during peace processes.
Separating victims’ needs as if unrelated to the political context is another way of
twisting the individual and collective relationship. Hiving off victims’ needs as something that
can be addressed like a set of symptoms through a series of interventions (e.g., counselling)
23

The notion of thinking of trauma as sequential comes from the work of Hans Keilson, who developed the concept of
sequential traumatisation. This is discussed at length in David Becker, “Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes: The
Illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma,” in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Con ict
Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 2006); Brandon Hamber, Transforming Societies; Hans
Keilson, Sequential Traumatization in Children: A Clinical and Statistical Follow-up Study on the Fate of the Jewish War
Orphans in the Netherlands, trans. Yvonne Bearne et al. (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1992).
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would be an example of this. Perhaps the area where we see the biggest imposition of an
external desire to move processes forward at a different pace to that of how individuals might
address their needs is in the language of “closure” or when “nations” are expected to be healed,
and the society is somehow meant to buy into this rhetoric. An example would be the way that
the massacre of Ndebele people during the Gukuruhundi25 in Zimbabwe has been written off as
a “moment of madness” and all memorialization of events were mostly closed down in the
name of national unity through the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord between the Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).26 According
to Eppel, the meaning of the Unity Accord that brought an end to the Gukuruhundi was
primarily interpreted to mean “you cease to exist and we will stop killing you.”27 A similar
example is the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in which the government policy of
memorialization and re-education has been criticized for being a form of indoctrination
stressing reconciliation over honest dialogue about the past.28 This approach in Rwanda, which
requires being in step with the state narrative, leads to ostracization of those who refuse to
conform to the national storyline,29 or certain individual keeping a low pro le in society.30
Furthermore, nations as entities do not have psyches as such, and merging of individual
psychological concepts into the national and political realm (“the nation will be healed”) is often
more about political projects such as nationalism than representing a precise conceptual
category.31 Such phenomena, however, are also not only restricted to the level of national
discourses. There are many examples of where different groups and governments try and move
victim experiences to be in line with their ideas of what they think is needed post-violence. For
example, some human rights groups can “pressurize” victims into recasting their experience
and suffering into the unfamiliar language of law, rights, and violations. There have also been
critiques of international NGOs, for example in Guatemala, focusing on sexual violence (as
crucial as this is) in a narrow way undermining a broader focus on the structural conditions that
continue to fuel inequality and violence.32 Similarly, we should not forget that victims
themselves are political agents who can and do use their victim status to achieve political ends.
For example, they may frame their experiences in a language be tting legal processes or one
that makes a claim to economic entitlement.

25

The Gukuruhundi refers to the massacres of the Ndebele people by the notorious 5 Brigade in Matabeleland during
the early 1980s. See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation,
Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report into The Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980–1988
(Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation, 1997); see also
Ruth Murambado, “‘We Cannot Reconcile Until the Past has been Acknowledged:’ Perspectives on Gukurahundi
from Matabeleland, Zimbabwe,”African Journal on Con ict Resolution 15, no. 1 (2015), 33–58.

26

Duduzile S. Ndlovu, “Let Me Tell my Own Story: A Qualitative Exploration How and Why ‘Victims’ Remember
Gukurahundi in Johannesburg Today” (PhD diss., University of the Witwatersrand, 2017).
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2009), 5, accessed December 1, 2021, http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/opin/eppel_gpa_vs_unity_accord_090225.doc.
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Harvard Human Rights Journal 18, (2005), 201–223, accessed November 13, 2021, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
faculty_scholarship/377; also see Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating
the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Affairs 110, no. 438 (2011), 1–34.
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Contemporary Rwanda,” in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2013–2014, ed. Filip Reyntjens et al. (Paris:
L’Harmattan 2014); Reyntjens, Constructing the Truth.
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In summary, our work over the last decades has revealed that we can never design a
collective process or processes that can fully meet all individual needs because needs are
psychologically complex and dynamic. Power is also always at play, not only in who or what
violations are focused on which often leads to a contestation about who is most deserving as
victims,33 but is also tied into the language we use. There are power dynamics and incentives
implicit in championing different approaches such as reconciliation, justice, and forgiveness and
forgetting. Therefore, we need to think deeply about the context of violence and consider the
underlying assumptions and language that are mobilized in the social and political space. To
extend the ndings we outline above to the notion of collective healing is even more
challenging and raises many vexing questions. Applying a temporal and intergenerational lens
to these challenges adds further complications and we turn to these questions now as an area in
need of ongoing work.
Conditionality and Ambivalence in Intergenerational Healing
Over time in societies that have experienced mass atrocity, and once those who directly
experienced the violence have died, the legacies of mass atrocity seem to live on in the next
generation. Subsequent generations give meaning to the atrocities of their parents and grandparents, and even distant relatives and ancestors experienced. One only needs to teach a class
on political violence in South Africa or any European country for that matter, as both the
authors routinely do, to know that for many students, who have never experienced direct
political violence, the colonial past and its reverberations are very much alive. This is embodied
in campaigns such as the #Feesmustfall campaign and its af liated campaigns such as
#Rhodesmustfall, a campaign in South Africa and later in the UK to remove statues of Cecil
John Rhodes, the colonial administrator and nancier, from educational institutions as part of
broader decolonization of academia.34 This student-led movement that swept through South
Africa highlights the issues described above; the conditionality of healing on processes of
apology, justice and reparation, the interlinkages of different mechanisms of healing and the
inevitable ways that shifting contexts change the meaning of processes of healing over time. In a
class discussion hosted by one of the authors, a young ANC student representative talked about
how there was a need for a new TRC in South Africa. He referred to this as the TRC-C: A Truth
and Reconciliation—with Consequences—Commission. The ongoing experiences of poverty,
poor education and racial inequality in South Africa have meant, as it did for this young man,
that the meaning of the truth commission was reframed as something that “sold-out” black
South Africans. This is not an uncommon view in South Africa 20 years after the peace
process.35 The reconciliatory vision espoused by Nelson Mandela and his legacy is now hotly
debated particularly among the youth, many of whom consider Mandela and his cohort of
peacemakers as favoring the reconciliation of relationships between black and white South

33

Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, “Victimology in Transitional Justice: Victimhood, Innocence and
Hierarchy,” European Journal of Criminology 9, no 5 (2012), 527–538.

34
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et al., eds., Rioting and Writing: Diaries of Wits Fallists (Johannesburg: Society, Work and Development Institute
(SWOP), University of the Witwatersrand, 2017); Brian Kwoba et al., Rhodes Must Fall: The Struggle to Decolonise the
Racist Heart of Empire (London: Zed Books, 2018).
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Africans over demanding prosecution of apartheid perpetrators and ensuring the redistribution
of wealth.36
In other words, even in the context of a revered political leader and peacemaker such as
Nelson Mandela, the interpretation of the past is never static. As we will argue below, what
happens intergenerationally is dependent on what has gone before and the nature of the
present, among other factors. This process, as with individual healing, is deeply ambivalent,
contingent, and contested. We will argue that the memories and associated traumas of the past
are not carbon-copied from one generation to the next. They have a deep symbolic as well as
material content. The past, therefore, and how we remember it and come to terms with it, takes
on a life of its own, manifesting in a myriad of ways relative to the present in a dynamic process
of writing and re-writing that is not merely about the functions memories and the past might
serve in the present.
Looking Forward and Looking Back: The Line Between Memory and History
Most things are forgotten over time. Even the war itself, the life-and-death struggle
people went through is now like something from the distant past...But still, no matter
how much time passes, no matter what takes place in the interim, there are some things
we can never assign to oblivion, memories we can never rub away. They remain with us
forever, like a touchstone.37
Given the conditional and ambivalent quality of healing, we argue that it is useful to pay
attention to the intersection of history, memory, and politics if we are to attend to its
intergenerational impacts and create lasting peace. What the above examples already illustrate
is how remembering is never an unmediated representation of the past but rather a site of
contestation.38 Far from being a simple recollection of facts, memory is instead a process of
“imagining facts”39 and an act of interpretation and meaning-making. In this light, memory
re ects:
[An] array of different cultural-historical discourses within
which this term...is used to describe and carry out certain
practices. As a consequence, the topic, and concept of memory
must be seen as a cultural-historical phenomenon.40
This suggests that memory, while focussed on the past, is shaped and given meaning by
the present.41 As social and political contexts change, so does the meaning of past violence, and
the ways that it is memorialized. Stemming from this, the actions deemed legitimate and
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appropriate in response—just as we argued that healing, which concerns events of the past—are
also mediated through the present. But much writing in transitional justice and peace studies,
and even our own earlier academic work, remains in the immediate post-con ict phase and its
resulting processes of remembering, memorialization and attempts at healing. If we take
seriously the notion that all history is a history of the present,42 we need to understand how the
meaning of events change over a longer period, and in fact, are continually changing given the
so-called present is never static.
This is particularly important because memory can be functional or instrumental,
essentially being interpreted for speci c social and political ends,43 and always vulnerable to
appropriation and manipulation.44 Theories of this nature see memory as a “mask concealing
the interests of the powerful” that is always given new meaning in new cultural environments.45
As Schudson notes: “Examples of instrumentalization are legion. Indeed, the problem may be to
nd cases of cultural memory that cannot be readily understood as the triumph of present
interests over truth.”46 Typically strategies of the instrumentalization of collective memory47
include the “glorification of the past, identification with national heroes, use of master
narratives, and reducing actors to their assumed motivations and not their actions.”48 This can
manifest in so-called “culture wars” or a new “meta-con ict” about history, experience and
whose interpretation of the past is correct. This is then used, at different times, to make claims
to entitlements, to exclude, to legitimate violence, to recover from violence and/or to promote
peace. The collective memories that are articulated (and the resulting silences) shape how
society determines who belongs and who does not, and the entitlements associated with
belonging. Thus, we need to acknowledge that victims and perpetrators are both used for
political gain by others and are themselves political agents.
But there is much more to memory than its instrumental use and misuse. Memory is
never the property of an individual. It cannot exist alone but rather stems from our interactions
with others.49 As Halbwachs reminds us, collective memories of groups are never universal but
rather “require[s] the support of a group delimited in space and time.”50 All memory is social,
according to Schudson and “located in institutions rather than in individual human minds in
the form of rules, laws, standardized procedures, and records, a whole set of cultural practices
through which people recognize a debt to the past.”51 Memory can not only be used by groups
to promote political-strategic ends, social solidarity and preserve identity but collective
memories can also facilitate change and shape the direction memory takes for future
generations. That said, this is a contested process, and although the past can be used and
misused in the present, it cannot simply be reconstructed at will.52
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Research looking at the impacts of large-scale memorialization and memory practices
(such as truth commissions or the creation of memorials) has tended to focus on the potential
for such activities to achieve reconciliation53 or how they translate into the everyday lives of
people and what sense people make of them.54 But much more work is needed to understand
how second and third generations respond to and remake the meaning of past atrocities. As
Hoffman claims, transmitted memory is an “example of an internalized past, of the way in
which atrocity literally reverberates through the minds and lives of subsequent generations,”55
and this reverberation, we argue, is not merely instrumental but social, cultural, political, and
psychological.
Here the literature has been unhelpfully dominated by questions of whether those who
did not directly experience atrocities are telling the truth and whether/how they too can
experience the trauma associated with violence they did not experience. Recent literature has
moved away from these overly simpli ed versions of truth and experience to a recognition that
subsequent generations grapple with vivid memories that are handed down through
generations and (re)interpret these through the lens of their present in a dynamic way. When we
consider mass atrocities such as slavery, to argue this has no traumatic content (used in the
widest sense of trauma speaking to a deep psychological wound) for the current generations
and descendants of former slaves misses the gravity of such atrocities and how we remember.
We need to ask, therefore, what kind of knowledge is possible for later generations? What form
does/can this traumatic knowledge take? Is it possible to heal, or at least “live with” such
legacies?
Work on the Holocaust perhaps holds the greatest lessons for those of us working in
more recent post-con ict societies. This body of literature highlights the tension for later
generations between the compulsion to know and the need to forget.56 There are many different
levels of remembering whereby descendants of the victims of atrocities come to know about
them through themes in their lives that become a part of their identity.57 In this way, the rst
generation following mass atrocity shapes the knowledge and forgetting of the second
generation, the second generation then shapes this for the next, and so on. This is a dynamic
non-linear process as the past is given meaning in light of the present. Recreating and
preserving the past therefore becomes about engaging in the discontinuities in history as a
“subtle interplay between the inaccessible and the non-existent” while keeping an eye on the
present.58 That said, despite its fragmented reality, the process of remembering the past also
seeks to create a continuity between generations at the same time.59 This continuous and
unremitting yet disjointed knowledge of the trauma weaves through the memories of the
second generation. After mass atrocity this is a powerful and visceral process. Auerhahn and
Laub argue that it is best to conceptualize the second generation after the Holocaust as
witnesses even though of course, they did not physically witness the events.60 This is what
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Fine61 refers to as absent memory whereby memory is lled with gaps and silences whilst being
ever-present:
Subsequent generations of writers who carry the burden of
Holocaust history write from a memory vacuum, from the
liminal space constituted by the conscious awareness of a
history from which one has been materially but not culturally
excluded. Such nonwitnesses, as Gary Weissman suggests,
might be thought of as being “haunted not by the traumatic
impact of the Holocaust, but by its absence.”62
Here the trauma extends not in the re-enactment and re guring of the event, but in the
absence of conscious or unconscious perception of the reality of the experience.63 Thus when
young people in post-con ict societies “witness” the mass atrocities of the past they do so from
the vantage point of the present whilst re-presenting and negotiating a received life experience.
The second-generation write memory while also writing into memory; constantly struggling
with not having experienced the actual events yet simultaneously experiencing the trauma
associated with atrocities.64 Inevitably, this process of creating memory can be used
instrumentally in the current context, but what is happening for the subsequent generation as
the “witness” the mass atrocities of the past has its own dynamic and powerful resonances at
the same time.
Writing on aboriginal experiences, Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman note the effects of
intergenerational trauma.65 They refer to the second generations trauma as “postmemory”
whereby the second generation reclaims memories so powerful that they constitute
remembering in their own right.66 For Aarons this second generation are “direct heirs to the
legacy of traumatic rupture and the indirect recipients of an inheritance existing only in their
imperfect imaginations.”67 Brave Heart thus uses the term “historical trauma response” to
encapsulate the loss experienced by the second generation.68 Such massive traumatic ruptures
affect not only individuals but also social dynamics, language, culture and family bonds, and
the loss and its impact cannot always be captured in psychological symptoms (even though
these may be present).
Thus, Aarons asks what happens when memory is transformed into history, and we
would add when it moves through and is embedded in all aspects of cultural and social life.69
The memories of mass atrocities remain a distressing lens through which the present is
interpreted. For example, in post-apartheid South Africa institutions such as education or
policing, given their harrowing past under apartheid, can never be free from history to
completely recreate it without reference to the past. But importantly for individuals, the
61
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historical traumatic rupture of mass atrocity not only has an institutional impact. The
inheritance of the memories of the past generations of mass atrocity also creates a set of
obligations in the next generation—obligations to transmit memory and to continue the struggle
(or for the descendants of oppressors to possibly forget the past or attempt re-write it in a more
positive light). As Schudson reminds us: “memories are commitments; memories are promises.
People will not release important personal or group memories without a struggle.”70 This is not
a pathological inheritance or some sort of individual imprinting from generation to generation
of past traumas in a linear clinical psychological way, but something signi cantly more
complex, i.e., a psychological, socio-cultural, and moral inheritance that plays itself out in
relation to the present. Such a process is carried, not solely in individuals, but through social
interactions both historical and collective (which in the case of mass atrocity are often pervasive
in the society), and only “later” are “internalized in a deeply visceral and unconscious way.”71
Memory, for those living after mass atrocity, is thus an inescapable and dynamic
morally-loaded weight that the second (and subsequent) generations has to bear, both the
descendants of the oppressors and the oppressed. This conceptualization moves beyond a
functionalist view of memory, or a narrow form presentism in which the past is “a mere screen
on which the contemporary society projects its own image.”72 In other words, current memories
are not merely there for instrumental political use in the present, but rather the contested nature
of mass atrocity (especially in deeply divided societies) creates a complex psychological process
of remembering and forgetting playing itself out in an ever-changing present that is rife with
competing collective memories and power struggles. This is akin to Schudson’s view that
instrumentalization never operates independently of other processes and collective memories
are always open to contestation.73
Just as the immediate victims of mass atrocity might struggle with the desire to recollect
traumatic events and forget them at the same time, as we mentioned earlier, subsequent
generations from mass atrocity are engaged in a complex psychological process that is beyond
stereotypical (often negative) functionalist interpretations. Such functional ways of thinking
about memory in South Africa, for example, are evident in such tropes as “playing the race
card” assuming bringing up the apartheid past is only for personal bene t, or in the case of
white South Africans wanting “reconciliation” is simply as a way of trying to ensure ongoing
economic privilege. Put another way, our approach shifts the focus away from both the
pathological impact of trauma on subsequent generations, as well as simply assuming bringing
up or avoiding the past is merely for personal gain or functional political reasons. Instead,
considering the issue of memory in societies living with a legacy of mass atrocity from the
perspective of its moral weight and seeing this process as a dynamic psychological liability that
is continuously being written and re-written in the present potentially opening a more sensitive
space for re ection and dialogue on what intergenerational healing means. This aligns with
Pierre Nora’s observation that the idea of “generation” only makes sense “in a framework of
discontinuity and rupture.”74
Of course, one cannot escape the reality of ongoing injustices and the material legacies
of colonialism for example. However, the profound fracturing of the social and psychological
that mass atrocity creates in subsequent generations, opens the door for the potential for a
shared empathic re-imaging, rather than seeing the past as a narrow battleground over who
controls the present. When the suffering of the past is of the magnitude of slavery, colonialism
or apartheid, arguing for forgetfulness; interpreting memory struggles in the present as merely
instrumental; believing that rectifying structural injustices will simply repair history; and
70
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under-estimating the psychological weight mass atrocity places on subsequent generations
(who continue to “witness” it) and how this is in constant ux, is a form of historical denialism.
What does this mean for Lasting Peace?
Excuse me,” Belbo said to Agliè, “but your argument is simply post hoc ergo ante hoc.
What follows causes what came before. You must not think linearly. The water in these
fountains doesn’t. Nature doesn’t; nature knows nothing of time. Time is an invention
of the West.75
This discussion brings out ve main points that can help us to imagine the conditions for lasting
peace. Each of these points re ect back to the importance of understanding the
intergenerational impact of mass atrocities.
Firstly, in the elds of transitional justice and peace studies often the horizon of what
peace means is too limited in scope and time, embodied in such terms as post-con ict or postagreement. When it comes to mass atrocity and legacy the discussion above shows that the
impact lasts much longer, and can destabilize societies well into the future. In post-con ict
situations, con icting groups often have to continue to live with each other and whether
violence ares up depends on several complex factors. As Staub notes: “For example, a
historical/psychological focus on the military defeat of Serbia by the Turks at Kosovo in 1389
seemed to reaf rm Serb victimization and the sense of the world as dangerous…[and] may
have added to the nationalism that resulted in the wars and mass killings in the former
Yugoslavia.”76 Thus, as we have discussed, old con icts shape contemporary experiences in
evolving ways.
Secondly, as Staub rightly notes,77 reconciliation is a changed attitude and behavior
towards the other group and an awareness that a different kind of relationship is possible.
However, this changed psychological orientation is rooted in the political, structural, and
institutional processes that exist and are set up after peace is negotiated.78 In Northern Ireland,
for example, the possibility for reconciliation (or at least a peace agreement) was promoted by
the increased economic and educational possibilities for the Catholic minority.79 This stands in
contrast to the youth of South Africa who makeup 72% of the unemployed population and have
been referred to as a ticking time bomb. These two contrasting examples attest to the
signi cance of the post-con ict context for creating the possibility (or having the potential to
undermine) lasting peace and reconciliation.80 For subsequent generations the conditions for
lasting peace may be more connected to long-term injustices such as cycles of intergenerational
poverty that are more dif cult to measure than the immediate harm (such as direct human
rights violations) that processes such as truth commissions seek to address. Acknowledgement
of past atrocities should recognize that the past continues to create structural injustices such as
poverty and unequal education, among many others.81
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In addition to the need for structural and social justice, Staub identi es
acknowledgement of the harm caused as an important aspect of long-term peace.82 Often
perpetrators continue to deny their actions or that they were harmful. In addition, many have
shown that deep and meaningful contact across con icting groups is needed for reconciliation
or the rebuilding of relationships.83 Forgiveness is facilitated by apology and regret.84 But what
is interesting here when one considers the second and later generations of mass atrocity is what
sort of apology and regret are we talking about, especially if immediate perpetrators are dead?
This points to the limits of the individual psychological models of healing used in transitional
justice as outlined earlier that specify a conditionality in relation to healing often associated
with the actions of the direct perpetrator.
Thirdly, acknowledgement of the past is not merely about addressing the structural
through new policies; as necessary as this is. Acknowledgement also contains a symbolic
component, i.e., the recognition that injustice of an unimaginable scale took place in the past
and it strongly reverberates in the present with real consequences. Acknowledging such realities
is not tied to the direct perpetrators, and the enormity of injustices such as slavery, colonialism
or apartheid, demands a recognition that moves beyond xed temporal or geographic realities.
The idea of the new generation becomes the symbolic unit of time.85
Acknowledgement leads us to the fourth important dimension of lasting peace, which
is that institutional and political arrangements need to be set up in a way that is shaped by longterm impacts of atrocities. For example, Vandiginste compares the different approaches take by
Rwanda and Burundi after the genocide and refers to the Rwandan approach as a kind of ethnic
amnesia where integration and civic identity were expected.86 However, he notes that the youth
continue to see ethnicity as important and want to know the ethnicity of signi cant others in
their lives.87 Thus the meaning of ethnicity is changing, but it remains important even as the
national public discourse sees it as taboo. He notes, as an illustration, an ongoing ethnicization
of sexual politics among young Rwandans, including the kinds of ethno-gendered stereotypes
that commonly used to fuel the genocide.88 He also notes the sense of marginalization of young
Hutu men—again a phenomenon that drove the genocide.89 On the other hand, the Burundian
approach was one of ethnic power-sharing. He argues that both these approaches were driven
by the nature of the political transition and the interests of the political elites of the time.90
However, they have very different consequences for the second generation and the versions of
knowledge/memory that are possible for them. In both these country examples, we see how the
representations of the past by the second generation are at odds with those of the rst
generation because of how they are shaped by context and incomplete processes of healing.
Furthermore, fully acknowledging the legacy such mass atrocities and their ability to
continue to shape the present requires an implicit recognition that mass atrocities of such
magnitude were not the product of a corrupt regime, a dictator or a handful of perpetrators but
societal (or even global) phenomenon. Acknowledging the existence of mass atrocity, and their
legacies, therefore further requires that such atrocities are recognized as having a political and
social origin (e.g., they originated because of racism, greed, or ideologies of white supremacy).
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Without this full acknowledgement, and particularly if we accept our earlier arguments about
the weight of intergenerational harm caused by mass atrocity, healing, either collectively or at
an individual level, is stymied.
Fifthly and nally, there is a need to understand the complex connections between
individual and societal healing. To draw on the work of Dan Bar-Tal,91 all con icts, especially in
deeply divided contexts, originate within a speci c con ict ethos and are predicated on a set of
shared societal beliefs. Built on individual beliefs (basic units of knowledge categories such as
ideology, values, norms, decisions, inferences, goals, expectations, religious dogmas, or
justi cations), societal beliefs are enduring beliefs and collective ideas shared by society
members, and perceived by society members as characterizing their society. Not everyone
shares all the societal beliefs, and societal beliefs are not merely a collective expression of what
different individuals believe, but rather such societal beliefs have transcendent characteristics
often embodied in social institutions, debates, and how societies cope. In other words, they tell
us about where society comes from and its aspirations about where it is going, and give society
meaning in the present.92 Societal beliefs are made up of (and also produce) “myths, collective
memories, symbols, ideologies, self-images, images of other societies, goals, values, or societal
aspirations.”93 Societal beliefs, according to Bar-Tal, then make up the ethos of society, that is,
the con guration of central societal beliefs or the unique totality of societal beliefs that provides
the central characterization to the society and gives it a particular orientation. An ethos “gives
meaning to societal life for society members” and as such is the shared mental basis for society
membership.94 In other words, shared understandings of society (or groups) are pervasive and
also dif cult to alter.95
The notion of societal beliefs and ethos is helpful when conceptualizing the legacy of
mass atrocity as it highlights that changing, and acknowledging the past, requires a shaking of
fundamental ideas held by certain groups about the society (or the world) in which such
atrocities took place. To this end, it highlights the limits of healing as conceptualized as an
individual problem of direct human rights violations. Mass atrocity involves an
acknowledgement of the harm done by individual perpetrators alone but the recognition of a
more deep-rooted societal ethos that gave rise to the mass atrocity that may not be bound by the
present historical reality. Acknowledging the nature of this shadowy ethos can shake the
foundations of societal belief systems, and the social identity of particular groups aligned96 with
perpetrators in some way. It for this reason, when one asks how the legacy of slavery or
apartheid should be acknowledged many are left wanting, as a valid acknowledgement would
require questioning the fundamental ethos of society (and its founding myths and historical
origins) and the heritage of speci c groups within those societies.
Bar-Tal sees societal beliefs as allowing individuals to co-operate collectively, and sees
them as prone to change (albeit slowly) when a disjuncture between beliefs and function arise:
Societal beliefs change through the process of negotiation, in
which leaders, the intellectual elite, media sources, economic
decision makers, and other groups take part. The negotiation,
which takes the form of public debate, may go on for years,
until a new societal belief evolves.97
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On many levels this is true, and as we can see in societies such as South Africa or
Northern Ireland, issues of the past are a daily form of public debate, and it would be dif cult
not to sustain an argument that societal beliefs have evolved in both societies since peace
agreements in the 1990s. However, what we would add to the work of Bar-Tal is much deeper
recognition of the symbolic importance of what acknowledgement of past atrocity means and
why it is so challenging to attain. In South Africa, for example, truly acknowledging the legacy
of apartheid, means acknowledging that the entire colonial project and systemized racism that
followed was an indefensible project along with the social ethos that created the system. This
brings into question the underlying social meanings, culture, and beliefs held by certain groups,
mainly whites who held apartheid societal beliefs and also bequeathed these to their children.
Undoing, and faithfully acknowledging the legacy of apartheid for such groups, is akin to a
form of existential annihilation.
Conclusion: A Radical Re-Imaging
Having been brought up in a hair-trigger society where the ground rules were – if no
physically violent touch was being laid upon you, and no outright verbal insults were
being levelled at you, and no taunting looks in the vicinity either, then nothing was
happening, so how could you be under attack by something that wasn’t there?98
The challenge for societies emerging from mass atrocity, and arguably with even more longterm legacies of direct and structural violence concerning colonialism, is that we can never
“make good.” Nevertheless, in public bodies such as truth commissions and prosecution
processes, and sometimes in the words of politicians and the general public, closure is often
advocated. Immediately following political violence, when concepts such as closure are
introduced into public discourse or, for that matter, other tropes (“We need to turn the page but
not close the book,” “We should forgive but not forget,” “We should prioritize the living victims
not the dead ones,” “We need think about contemporary economic well-being not the past,”) we
need to be aware that these are intertwined, depending on who is advocating them, with social
and political power. In other words, there is often a struggle over who frames the political
debate about the past, and who may or not bene t in terms of social and political space in terms
of this framing. The past can be used instrumentally in a myriad of ways. But, when
considering mass atrocity over a more extended time and intergenerationally what we have
added to this in this article is that the recognition of mass atrocity brings with it other demands,
an almost immeasurable weight of history and memory on the next generations—a deep
psychological rupture and liability. This is present not only for perpetrators and oppressors (or
their descendants) but also for those and their families directly, and indirectly, affected by
legacies of mass atrocity.
We have chosen to refer to this legacy, not as a form of intergenerational trauma as such,
but rather a psychological and moral inheritance that plays itself out in relation to the present
but for those involved is akin to witnessing and being part of a profound and ongoing historical
rupturing. The challenge when it comes to thinking about healing such ruptures is in the rst
instance recognizing the full encumbrance of this inheritance on subsequent generation, a
weight that can challenge the foundations of the social ethos and the foundation of the societies
in which they were born. We cannot dismiss the affective impact of mass atrocity on subsequent
generations as functional or instrumental in a one-dimensional way or easily eradicated
through structural change or therapeutic interventions alone. The social, cultural, and
psychological impact of the past on subsequent generations requires a recognition of harm akin
to having experienced it and the creation of social space for this to be shared and re-coded with
new meanings relative to the present. Healing and social reconstruction comes not just through
what is done but also through the process and the authenticity (often evident in discourse and
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action) with which we try to address social problems. In engaging constructively in the messy
business of the past, the overriding task is therefore to create a holding or conducive
environment that opens rather than closes social and political space so that different and often
divergent voices and approaches to restoration can emerge.
This, however, creates a challenge for processes of conditional forms of meaningmaking typically seen in transitional justice (apology, truth-telling, oral histories, trials), as they
tend to conceptualize suffering as largely linked to direct violations within living memory
rather than intergenerationally. There is however much to learn from these processes—the
unrepairable nature of harm, when reparations and apologies are effective or not, the value and
limits of truth-telling and justice—but thinking of large-scale structural, cultural, and social
destruction visited upon society through mass atrocities such as colonialism demands a
response that moves beyond a liberal institutional approach.
Drawing on what we know about healing in the immediate aftermath of human rights
violations for individuals, this process is a deeply ambivalent process. For the second
generation of the victims of mass atrocity, as noted, they are often torn between wanting to
move on from the past, but also acutely aware of its ever-present nature. For the perpetrators,
and their descendants, to fully acknowledge the nature of mass atrocities such as apartheid or
slavery, would require the negation of much of the ethos of the essence of the societies from
which they come. Arguably this is necessary, albeit challenging to attain, and whether this is
forthcoming or not, in most divided societies different groups must continue to live side-byside. To this end, nding ways to represent and acknowledge the gravity of the past is essential.
Acknowledgement for almost unimaginable mass atrocity, requires more than one-off events or
institutional responses (the grand apology, the truth commission), but rather acknowledgement
has to become a lived reality, almost a continuous form of apology (or at least recognition of the
past) in many different social interactions (the board room, the sports eld, the church, the
classroom, in politics) and from different sources (from government, institutions, by
associations and individuals) changing in nature, tone, and resonance over time. Symbolic
processes also have much to offer. Museums such as the Holocaust Museum in Berlin show
some promise in this regard, i.e., by constructing a massive permanent mark on the landscape
as a reminder of the magnitude (at least to a modest degree considering the enormity of what
happened) of the atrocities committed.
To be sure, social justice, inclusion, and economic equality are also vitally important
both structurally and in terms of legislation to address the legacies of the past—but what we
have argued here is that there is also a more expansive psychological and cultural process at
play when dealing with legacies of mass atrocity. This process is symbolic in so far as we try to
capture what the impossible process of acknowledging the real legacy of a system like
apartheid, or the ongoing legacies of colonialism in the world today, would entail. We have
argued against the idea that how we interpret the past is simply instrumental and aims to serve
current strategic or political ends. Of course, this can be the case, but even so, this generally coexists with a much more profound social process of trying to integrate the rupture of mass
atrocity into the present. We need to create the social and political space for “each generation to
rewrite its generational history”99 allowing it to move “from rst-hand accounts to critical
re ection”100 rather than seeking to dictate how the past should be understood and interpreted
or minimizing its generational affect.
Understanding how the legacy of mass atrocity continues to play itself out in the
present is therefore not a simple task, but a negotiation that is contingent on many factors from
the method of collection and recollection to the wider political process, and these raise
questions as to whether it is even appropriate to apply concepts such as healing to collective
political processes of remembering—or put another way it means, as we argued earlier, we can
only ever think of healing in such contexts as an ambivalent process fraught with
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contradictions. If what we have learned about dealing with mass atrocity following peace
processes is anything to go by, we can be sure that trying to understand the impact of the past
from one generation to the next will not be easily predictable, inevitable, or generalizable.
Considering the impact of mass atrocity (and how we remember, live with, and record it) over a
longer time horizon, therefore, demands a reframing of some of the now standardized
approaches to addressing the past in immediate years after cessation of violence (such as
transitional justice). This reframing is as much about political action (addressing inequalities,
racism, exclusion, and political debate) as an act of re-imaging given life through constant and
contested re-writing.
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